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On 22 September 1999 the dead body of an 18-year-
old girl was found in a cemetery in Istanbul, Turkey.
Massive media coverage was launched when the po-
lice discovered that she had been killed by two
young men and a young woman, who, claiming to be
Satanists, testified that one of them had orders from
Satan to perform the sacrifice. When the public pros-
ecutor used the description of Satanism in the formal
charges brought against the accused, Satanism en-
tered the legal documents as a new crime for the first
time in Turkish legal history. The three perpetrators
were judged guilty of murder and were sentenced to
a total of 25 years in prison.
Construction of
S a t a n i s m
in Turkish Secularist and
Islamist Newspapers
Although since the youths were imprisoned
media interest in Satanism has died down,
all newspapers had covered the issue ex-
tensively in the period leading up to and in-
cluding their trial. There were conferences,
talk shows and heated debates on various
television channels where important public
figures voiced their opinions on the issue.
The police declared Satanism an organized
terrorist group and began arresting youths
who were considered to be connected.
Places suspected of being hangouts of Sa-
tanists were raided, and bars and clubs ac-
cused of being frequented by adherents to
the movement were shut down.
This new, marginal issue of Satanism was
appropriated by different sectors of Turkish
society and placed into existing matrices.
However, before commencing with the dis-
cussion, the following brief overview of
constructionist theories offers useful tools
for understanding the Satanic hype.
Social problems are, according to con-
structionists, socially constructed. Instead
of concentrating on the analysis of actual
practitioners as was done in early sociolog-
ical literature, constructionists argued that
there was no significant Satanist danger, al-
though it has been defined as a social prob-
lem. Concentrating on the portrayal and
representation of Satanism, they under-
lined social mechanisms such as Ôscape-
goatingÕ and stereotyping in public re-
sponses to Satanism. Accordingly, the
forming of a stereotype involves the cre-
ation of a Ôreverse mirror image of oneÕs so-
cietyÕ in which the Ôevil enemyÕ is depicted
as having all those unflattering qualities
that contrast with the virtues of that soci-
ety. This activity aims at restoring an ideal-
ized society and serves the function of Ôuni-
fying the conflicting elements within a soci-
ety, by imposing unity on something that is
fragmentedÕ (Jeffrey S. Victor: Satanic Panic:
The Creation of a Contemporary Legend,
Chicago and La Salle: Open Court Press,
1993, p.41). It enables rising collective anxi-
ety to be released, especially in times of in-
creased tension.
If the ÔscapegoatingÕ is about construct-
ing an ideal society, is it possible to find
shared ideals between Islamic and secular
groups in Turkey? Indeed, there is a unify-
ing activity occurring as a result of the
shared patriarchal norms of both groups.*
Reading the newspapers
Both liberal/secular and Islamic newspa-
pers depict a Satanist stereotype and tell us
that the Satanists can be detected by their
physical appearance and behaviour. For in-
stance, M i l l i y e t states that Satanists Ômostly
come from richer families and live in better
neighbourhoods of the cities. They are in-
terested in perverse music types such as
heavy metal and black metal. They have
long hair and they wear black t-shirts with
Satan and skull prints on them. They look
unkempt and grungy. [Satanism] is com-
mon among youths between the ages of 14
and 25Õ (22 September 1999).
This basic stereotype of the Satanist as
being young, long haired, clad in black with
tattoos and earrings, looking untidy and lis-
tening to ÔperverseÕ music is repeated over
and over in all the papers Ð always with
some mention of alcohol, drugs, bars, clubs
and nightlife. Names of places that they fre-
quent and magazines they read are also
mentioned. Along with these descriptions
are vivid accounts of what they do, which
being generally very much against legal and
ethical conventions of Turkish society, help
to define the group as a social problem.
These accounts are similar in both groups of
papers. Accordingly, the Satanists Ôworship
Satan and conduct rituals in which they sac-
rifice virgins. They drink animal blood, [É]
they conduct activities that go beyond all
borders, and they carry out horrifying mur-
ders [É]Õ (Z a m a n, 22 September 1999).
ÔThey sacrifice their own children, have sex
with a newly killed corpse, kill their father
and mutilate his body without showing any
signs of guilty conscience, use young
women maliciously to drink their blood and
eat their internal organs. [É] They enter
into cemeteries at night, choose a girl
among themselves, cut her up with a knife,
smear her with animal blood and satisfy the
Satan by having intercourse with the muti-
lated girl. They are against all religions and
holy booksÕ (M i l l i y e t, 22 September 1999).
As the Satanists begin to be characterized
as ÔsickÕ, ÔpervertedÕ, Ôpsychologically unbal-
ancedÕ, and ÔlunaticÕ, or as ÔalienatedÕ, Ôde-
tachedÕ and ÔlostÕ, interpretations and moral
judgements about their existence and solu-
tions for preventing them come to the fore.
The accounts of both sides emphasize the
moral void of the youth that leads to a
search for identity. However, a discrepancy
emerges between the secular and Islamist
newspapers in their primary line of argu-
mentation. The majority of comments in the
Islamist newspapers explain the situation
not as a problem with the youth, but with
society and social life in general. The youth
is only one part of the whole in which the
problem is manifested. According to those
accounts, Turkish social life is becoming
alienated from its traditional cultural roots,
moral tradition and national/traditional val-
ues (Yeni Safak, 26 and 27 September 1999).
There is no longer a moral unity, national
culture or totality within Turkish society
(Milli Gazete, 24 September 1999). All this is
due to the severance of the nation from reli-
gion. Once religion, which is Ôthe most im-
portant factor in shaping a societyÕs moral
valuesÕ, is removed, the ensuing moral void
in society leaves the youth prey to all kinds
of marginal and perverse beliefs (Ibid.). It is
the system that pushes the youth to where
they end up, by not teaching them their reli-
gion properly, closing down the schools
that teach religion, and replacing them with
ÔmaterialistÕ education (Ibid., 25 and 26 Sep-
tember 1999). The youth, with proper Islam-
ic culture, would not Ôuse drugs, murder, [or]
drink bloodÕ (Ibid., 24 September 1999).
Some of these arguments have a harsh,
even accusing tone towards the secularists
for being the cause.
Secularist newspapers, on the other hand,
picture the problem more as one related to
adolescence, in which the identity-search-
ing youth somehow fall in to the hands of
those waiting to impart their dangerous be-
liefs. Not only ÔmysticÕ groups like that of the
Satanists, but Ôother materialist totalitarian
groupsÕ can also captivate the youth by of-
fering them a sense of belonging and iden-
tity (M i l l i y e t, 22 September 1999). This crisis
of identity is emerging from a system that
lacks meaning and is related to the traumas
of modernization. Hence, the cause is not lo-
cated in Turkey in another group, but is
rather a global issue of modernity. The solu-
tion also comes from the globe, especially
the West. It has been indicated that Western
societies encourage healthy communities
and voluntary organizations against illness-
es such as these, thus implying that Turkey
should do the same.
Points of convergence
The above findings reveal that even
though both liberal/secular and Islamist
newspapers present Satanism as a Ôbelief
systemÕ, there is never an indication that
people can actually choose to believe in it.
The Satanists are depicted as sick, atomized,
deviant or part of a terrorist group. They are
deceived, seized and captivated by danger-
ous forces or are coerced by the corrupt sys-
tem into the situation in which they find
t h e m s e l v e s .
Both secularists and Islamists have made
attempts to control the youth Ð which has
become an area of contestation, just as
ÔwomenÕ Ð since they are the perpetuators
of society and symbols of its ideals. Al-
though the Kemalist regime paid special at-
tention to gender roles and gender equality,
it did not change the patriarchal order but
rather maintained the basic cultural conser-
vatism of gender relations. These patriar-
chal norms of morality are, however, not
only hierarchical in terms of gender but also
in terms of age. Both Islamists and secular-
ists share this patriarchal norm regarding
the role and position of the youth. They
both see young people not as responsible
individuals, but as a group to be shaped for
the future. They postpone the present Ð a
situation in which young individuals are not
supposed to participate or to speak up, but
need to be educated, follow rules, obey, and
only realize themselves in the future. Both
groups also underline values such as obedi-
ence, education, loyalty, devoutness, seri-
ousness, decency, and modesty in outlook
and lifestyles Ð and not creativity, individual
choice or criticism. While secularists aspire
to westernization and modernization, they
nevertheless place limits on these. One has
to be modest; if not, one falls into decaden-
cy. Thus, both groups agree on setting
boundaries on excessive individualization.
Despite IslamistsÕ and secularistsÕ seem-
ingly different reasons for the existence of
Satanists, there is a unifying activity: both
groups conjoin in not accepting a different
mode of living, a different type of youth.
They both exclude those who do not fit the
patriarchal norms. Furthermore, in both in-
stances, the constructed stereotype is vague
and thus potentially targets anyone who is
part of a larger hard rock/heavy metal sub-
c u l t u r e .
Youth subcultures represent symbolic vio-
lations of social order and can be seen as
provoking the dominant culture. Groups
differentiate themselves through construct-
ing unique styles that define an identity and
offer particularity. They are collective articu-
lations of a cultural critique that establishes
and maintains a new self-concept and sym-
bolically challenges the dominant cultureÕs
value system.
In accordance with constructionist expla-
nations of Satanic hype, it can be seen that
in the context of growing tension between
Islamists and secularists a trigger event Ð
the murder story Ð leads to an explosion in
one of the areas of contestation in Turkish
society, revealing dissatisfaction with the
moral order. Nonetheless, the two groups
are united in their establishing of an enemy
that incarnates all the negative virtues to
which both aim to put an end. By overreact-
ing and depicting this subcultureÕs mem-
bers as deviants or terrorists, both sides
downplay the possibility that Satanism may
be presenting a social critique in the form of
symbolic violations of social order. Howev-
er, in both groups of newspapers as well as
in the accounts in this article, what is lacking
is the voice of the Satanists, both those who
call themselves such and those who are sim-
ply perceived as such. Without this, our un-
derstanding of the dynamics of this subcul-
ture and whether it presents a social cri-
tique is limited and undoubtedly deserves
greater attention.
N o t e
* The arguments in this article are based on the
authorÕs close reading of three liberal/secular and
three Islamic newspapers, namely Milliyet, Hurriyet,
Sabah, Yeni Safak, Zaman and Milli Gazete, for a 
15-day period following the event.
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